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A Changing World
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I. INTRODUCTION
A serious problem exists in the interpretation of some of the
world's most important treaties.1 This problem stems from the trea-
* Assistant Regional Counsel, Department of Treasury, U.S. Customs Service. A.B.,
1975, Oberlin College; J.D., 1978, Capital University Law School; LL.M. in International
Law, 1986, University of Miami School of Law. Mr. Ostapski is admitted to practice before
the Florida Bar, the Ohio Bar, the District of Columbia Bar, the United States District Court
for the District of Columbia, the United States District Court for the Southern District of
Florida, the United States District Court for the Middle District of Florida, the United States
Court of International Trade, and the United States Court of Military Appeals.
1. Treaties tied to gold include: Convention for the Unification of Certain Rules Relat-
ing to International Carriage by Air, Oct. 12, 1929, 49 Stat. 3000, T.S. 876, 137 L.N.T.S. 11
(The English translation of the treaty appearing at 49 Stat. 3000 is entitled, Convention for the
Unification of Certain Rules Relating to International Transportation by Air.); Convention on
Damage Caused by Foreign Aircraft to Third Parties on the Surface, Oct. 7, 1952, 310
U.N.T.S. 181; Supplementary to the Warsaw Convention, the Convention for the Unification
of Certain Rules Relating to International Carriage by Air Performed by a Person Other than
the Contracting Carrier, Sept. 18, 1961, 500 U.N.T.S. 31; Protocol to Amend the Convention
for the Unification of Certain Rules Relating to International Carriage by Air, Sept. 28, 1955,
478 U.N.T.S. 371; International Convention Concerning the Carriage of Goods by Rail
(CIM), Oct. 25, 1952, 242 U.N.T.S. 4; International Convention Concerning the Carriage of
Passengers and Luggage by Rail (CIV), Oct. 25, 1952, 242 U.N.T.S. 354; Convention on the
Contract for the International Carriage of Goods by Road (CMR), May 19, 1956, 399
U.N.T.S. 189; International Convention on Civil Liability for Oil Pollution Damage, Nov. 29,
1969, 973 U.N.T.S. 3; International Convention for the Unification of Certain Rules Relating
to the Limitation of the Liability of Owners of Seagoing Vessels, Aug. 25, 1924, 120 L.N.T.S.
123; International Convention for the Unification of Certain Rules Relating to Bills of Lading,
Aug. 25, 1924, 51 Stat. 233, T.S. No. 931, 120 L.N.T.S. 155; International Convention Relat-
ing to the Limitation of the Liability of Owners of Sea-Going Ships, Oct. 10, 1957,reprinted in
6 BENEDICT ON ADMIRALTY 5-11 (7th ed. 1983); Guatemala City Protocol, Mar. 8, 1971,
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ties' limitation of liability provisions that are stated in gold based
terms. Since gold has been demonetized, these limitations have no
agreed upon monetary value.
Legislative bodies, domestic and international courts, and schol-
ars have generally failed to separate certain issues relating to gold
based conventions. These issues concern: (1) the selection of a unit of
account; and (2) maintenance of value considerations in the face of
inflation. Furthermore, there exists an overriding concern whether
there should be limitation of liability in some gold-based conventions.
Proposals advanced by this Article 2 present some of the methods
of renegotiation used in redefining the appropriate limits of liability.
This Article concludes that a market price interpretation of the gold
clause applied on an ad hoc basis would presently serve as the most
useful remedy.
II. VALUE MAINTENANCE IN THE FACE OF INFLATION
Value is most commonly undermined by inflation, which "inevi-
tably leads to a reduction in the purchasing power (or real value) of
any fixed amount of money over time."'3 Maintaining the value of
nominally-fixed liability limitations in international conventions
presents a problem because if there is inflation, the real value of these
limits will decline over time. This consideration, however, is entirely
separate from the issue of whether liability should be limited in inter-
national conventions. If there were no limitations of liability, value
considerations would be moot. 4 In the absence of limitation of liabil-
ity, actual losses could be offset to a degree in an inflationary economy
by insurance or other methods of risk allocation. Obviously, propos-
als that address maintenance of value problems do not address the
fundamental issue of whether there should be any limits of liability in
international conventions.
reprinted in A. LOWENFELD, AVIATION LAW 985 (2d ed. Doc. Supp. 1981); Convention Re-
lating to the Carriage of Passengers and Their Luggage by Sea, Dec. 13, 1974, cited in R.
CHURCHILL & A. LOWE, THE LAW OF THE SEA xxvi (1983) (the Convention is not in force).
2. See infra text accompanying notes 77-113.
3. Ward, The SDR In Transport Liability Conventions: Some Clarification, 13 J. MAR.
L. & COM. 1, 16 (1981). See generally K. ROSENN, LAW AND INFLATION (1982).
4. See Franklin Mint Corp. v. Trans World Airlines, 690 F.2d 303, 312 (2d Cir. 1982),
aff'd on other grounds, 466 U.S. 243 (1984) (Stevens, J., dissenting). Judge Winter's circuit
court opinion provides a thoughtful discussion on the limitations of liability. The decision held
unenforceable the prospective application of the limitation of liability provisions of the Con-
vention for the Unification of Certain Rules Relating to International Transportation by Air,
Oct. 12, 1929, 49 Stat. 3000, T.S. No. 876, 137 L.N.T.S. 11.
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The value of money depends on the service it performs for its
user. Money can be a means of payment, measure of value, and a
store of value.5 Public confidence in the value of money governs its
intrinsic worth. The psychological acceptance of the value of a $10.00
gold piece is subject to different interpretations. Metallism postulates
that the weight and quality of precious metal determines the value of
a coin rather than the face value of the coin. Nominalism presumes
that the value of money is always its face value. The use of noncon-
vertible paper money ultimately doomed the metallist approach. De-
spite this development, holders of nonconvertible paper currency
experienced a psychological hallowness. Paper is merely paper unless
it can be redeemed or exchanged for something valuable. Gold as a
universal precious metal eventually became the standard by which
value was maintained.
The causes of inflation or its potential remedies will not be ex-
amined here.6 This analysis will instead focus on some methods used
to minimize inflation's damaging effects on a particular transaction.
Without an agreed upon stabilizing factor, any party to a currency
transaction runs the risk of loss. To counter this risk, ideally, a unit
of account should take into consideration price increases over time.
With varying degrees of success, parties have constructed clauses with
a unique definition of value and a method for its maintenance.
A "multiple currency clause" may simply contain a list of cur-
rencies in which repayment may be made. Such a clause, more accu-
rately called an "optional currency clause," places the risk of
exchange rate fluctuation on the debtor. Parties with superior bar-
gaining positions, by requiring optional currency clauses, have the
ability to speculate and demand repayment in the currency which has
most appreciated in value.
When parties have nearly equal bargaining positions neither
party has the strength to impose the risk of currency loss and fairness
considerations become more important. The unit of account clause
also becomes correspondingly more complex. Devised by interna-
tional financiers, composite units of account, popularly known as
"currency cocktails," contain a preformulated blend of several cur-
rencies. The European Composite Unit (Eurco), comprised of nine
separate currency units, is one such currency cocktail. Because
Eurco's value is tied to the daily fluctuation in exchange rates,
5. K. ROSENN, supra note 3, at 36.
6. K. ROSENN, supra note 3, at 7-12.
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"[w]hen most of the reference currencies move in the same direction
against a reference currency, the Eurco-denominated security be-
comes unduly advantageous for either borrowers or lenders."'7 More
sophisticated formulas can produce a more stable unit of account.
Yet, "[e]xperience indicates that the more complex a maintenance-of-
value arrangement becomes, the less likely it is to gain wide market
acceptance."" Human nature cannot easily accept that which it can-
not readily understand. And if eventually accepted, complex formu-
las may even breed an over confidence in their alleged accuracy. One
commentator aptly observed:
[I]t is also questionable whether the unit of account should be the
instrument with which to resolve the problem of declining real
value. It would appear more logical to approach the problem of
fixed limits of liability directly because substitution or manipula-
tion of the unit of account may introduce undesirable side-effects. 9
Valorism is an economic approach that directly deals with the
value of money. Valorists strive to develop new ways of assuring that
currency maintains the same purchasing power over time. One au-
thority in the field of law and economics has characterized valorists
as "the modem heirs of the metallists."' 0 Even though these two
schools of thought have a great deal in common, a significant differ-
ence also exists. Metallists identify money's value with the weight
and quality of hard asset hedges such as gold and silver. But valorists
conceive of value in the much broader context of the worth of goods
and services in relation to each other. Price indexes are constructed
to measure money's purchasing power" as to goods and services.
Countries with chronic inflation, such as Argentina, Brazil and Israel,
have enacted an "intricate web of monetary correction legislation"' 2
to literally legislate maintenance of value stability. Valorists deal with
maintenance of value problems in a short sighted way. The remedial
act of increasing nominal price levels to keep pace with inflation cre-
ates an inflationary expectation which then fuels the inflation which
the corrective act seeks to mitigate. 13 Maintenance of value consider-
7. Id. at 278.
8. Silard, Maintenance-of- Value Arrangements In International Transactions, 5 L. &
POL'Y INT'L Bus. 398, 437 (1973).
9. Ward, supra note 3, at 20.
10. K. ROSENN, supra note 3, at 58; see also supra text accompanying notes 3-6.
11. K. ROSENN, supra note 3, at 58.
12. Id. at 58.
13. Id. at 15.
526 [Vol. 9:523
The Touch of Gold
ations should not be divorced from the causes of inflation. Even
though "[e]conomists disagree about the causes of inflation,' 4 infla-
tion, in a broad way, is a manifestation of a maladjusted economy.
Compensating for this maladjustment is precisely the focus of value
maintenance. Even though "[t]he toothpaste of gold standard 'disci-
pline' cannot be put back in the tube,"' 5 fiscal responsibility is an es-
sential component in the construction of an effective maintenance of
value device. Fiscal responsibility is one way to stabilize an economy,
and, of course, stability is the goal of value maintenance.
III. PURPOSE OF GOLD CLAUSE LIMITATIONS IN
INTERNATIONAL LIABILITY CONVENTIONS
One method of appreciating a gold value limitation function is to
look at a typical provision. For instance, the Warsaw Convention
signed at Warsaw on October 12, 1929 contains a typical gold clause
limitation which states in its article 22 that "[t]he sums mentioned in
francs ... shall be deemed to refer to a currency unit consisting of
sixty-five and a half milligrammes of gold of millesimal fineness nine
hundred. 1 16 The mathematical precision of the preceding formula is
actually quite illusory since gold is now demonetized.
The rationale for tying liability to gold in international conven-
tions was really quite pragmatic. Once arriving upon the limitation
sum, the convention's delegates required a uniform, relatively stable
unit as a measure of value. Furthermore, gold was appealing because
of its universality.17 A review of the travaux preparatoires of the War-
saw Convention confirms the preceding analysis. Mr. Pittard, the
Swiss delegate, remarked that the focus should be on an international
value: "it's all the same to me, but let's take a gold value."'18 Gold
was selected in 1929 because it was the then existing international unit
of account free from the tamperings of any one nation. Despite all the
thoughtful discussions in hindsight, the delegates were not as thor-
ough as they could have been, since most of the delegates were "law-
14. Id. at 7.
15. Stein, The Futility of Economic Nostalgia, N.Y. Times, Aug. 12, 1984, at 2F, cols. 3-4.
16. See, e.g., Asser, Golden Limitations of Liability in International Transport Conven-
tions and the Currency Crisis, 5 J. MAR. L. & CoM. 645 (1974).
17. See Heller, The Value of the Gold Franc-A Different Point of View, 6 J. MAR. L. &
COM. 73, 91-92 (1974).
18. Homer & Legrez, Second Int'l Conference on Private Aeronautical Law, Minutes, 4-
12 Oct. 1928, Warsaw 89-90 (1975) (unofficial translation), reprinted in Barlow, Article 22 of
the Warsaw Convention: in a state of limbo 8 AIR L. 2, 12 n.68 (1983).
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yers who were not trained in the solution of precarious economic and
monetary world problems."' 9 The convention delegates thought they
found a solution, but had they? Now, "[t]here is no longer an interna-
tional monetary arrangement linked to gold, nor is there an official
gold price that will produce uniformity with respect to the limitations
of liability provisions."
'20
IV. THE RISE AND FALL OF THE GOLD STANDARD
The value of a unit of account of national currency was basically
defined in terms of gold or silver or both. Essentially, supply and
demand served as functions that determined the value of these pre-
cious metals. Gold, due to its scarcity, gained widespread acceptance
in the late nineteenth century as more nations demonetized silver.
Adoption of the gold standard by most of the civilized world resulted
in a system of fixed currency exchange rates based on the free
redeemability of gold and a fairly uniform world gold price. "The
basic rule of the gold standard is that the government should generate
the quantity of money that will keep the price of gold constant by
committing itself to buying and selling gold in an unlimited quantity
at a fixed price."' 21 World War I and the resultant inflation precipi-
tated the suspension of free convertibility. In reality, the "gold stan-
dard theory had little empirical basis, ' ' 22 because it did not take into
account actual economic conditions. Gold, as mighty as it was, could
not harness social and economic ills such as inflation, deflation, high
unemployment, and political unrest. International monetary reform
was needed, with gold still playing a vital role in the establishment of
a new system of currency stabilization.
In 1944, the Bretton Woods Conference produced a multilateral
treaty that established the International Monetary Fund [hereinafter
IMF]. The IMF Articles of Agreement, the "magna charta of inter-
national monetary law," established a system whereby gold became
the common denominator of currencies through the par value sys-
tem.23 Legal recognition was also given to gold as a commodity.
24
19. Asser, supra note 16, at 656 (statement by Mr. Berger describing a liability
convention).
20. K. ROSENN, supra note 3, at 270.
21. Stein, supra note 15, at 2F, col. 3.
22. K. ROSENN, supra note 3, at 50. For a detailed historical analysis of the value of
money, see Chapter 3.
23. Id. at 51.
24. Barlow, supra note 18, at 6.
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The IMF's resources, which came from its membership, produced a
stabilizing effect. A nation experiencing a short-term balance of pay-
ment problem could borrow from the fund. "Even though gold was
the 'ultimate' reserve asset,"'25 the U.S. dollar was the key currency in
IMF transactions. Only the dollar was convertible into gold, putting
the world "on a dollar standard. ' 26 In the two decades following the
formation of the IMF, the gold reserves of the United States dramati-
cally shrunk, and its debt outdistanced its reserve stockpile.
The Two-Tiered Gold System resulted from an overwhelming
private demand for gold as a commodity. In response to this demand,
gold had both an official price among governments and a free market
price. "[T]he two-tiered system was intended to insulate the official
and the private markets on the premise that there was no need to
increase the existing total stock held by monetary authorities. ' 27 This
development merely hastened the inescapable eventuality. On August
15, 1971, the United States terminated the practice of buying and sell-
ing gold freely at a fixed official price. The demonetization of gold
was made complete on April 1, 1978, when the official price of gold
was abolished by the Second Amendment to the IMF's articles. 28
V. THE GOLD CLAUSE AFTER DEMONETIZATION
The elimination of an official gold price completely confused the
interpretation of gold clauses in international conventions. 29 At least
one court had held the limitation of liability provisions in such a con-
vention to be prospectively unenforceable.30 This legal interpretation
by the prestigious U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, in
essence, nullified the convention because there was no longer a unit of
conversion to set the liability limit. However, the U.S. Supreme
Court in Trans World Airlines v. Franklin Mint Corp.,3t specifically
rejected this declaration regarding the future unenforceability of the
Warsaw Convention.
25. K. ROSENN, supra note 3, at 53.
26. Id.
27. Gold, Gold in International Monetary Law: Change, Uncertainty, and Ambiguity, 15
GEO. WASH. J. INT'L L. & ECON. 323, 342 (1981).
28. Bretton Woods Agreements Act, Amendments, Pub. L. No. 94-564, 90 Stat. 2660
(1976). In this Act, the U.S. Congress eliminated the official price of gold, effective April 1,
1978.
29. See Treaties cited supra note 1.
30. See Franklin Mint Corp. v. Trans World Airlines, 690 F.2d 303 (2d Cir. 1982), aff'd
on other grounds, 466 U.S. 243 (1984) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
31. 466 U.S. 243 (1984) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
1987] 529
Loy. L.A. Int'l & Comp. L. J.
With the demonetization of gold, a legal void existed in gold
based conventions. In response, academics offered different ways to
fill the lacuna.
A. Scholarly Comments
A school of thought emerged advocating conversion on the basis
of the free market price of gold. Members of this group included Je-
anpretre, Heller, Mendelsohn, Cheng, Tobolewski, Mankiewicz and
Edwards. 32 The rationale supporting their position differs. Heller has
stated that "[tihe purpose of the provisions of Article 22 of the War-
saw Convention which links the limits of liability to the value of gold
should be considered a gold value clause, adopted in order to ensure
that persons entitled to claim. . . can obtain compensation up to max-
imum amounts. '3 3 Mendelsohn, in a similar manner, proposed that
value be established "by the more meaningful price . . . in the free
world monetary market. ' 34 Others in the aforesaid group either hold
untenable positions or their analyses are incomplete. 35 As an exam-
ple, Tobolewski prematurely concluded that the free market price of
gold reflects world inflation. The free market approach concerns itself
with maintenance of value and effecting the supposed intent of the
drafters and not necessarily with the agreed liability limits in the con-
vention which may, in due course, become inadequate for reasons
such as inflation. Obviously, the danger with the free market ap-
proach is unauthorized treaty revision.
Despite the abolition of the official price in 1978, many scholars
still argue in support of it.36 Asser's view represents the fundamental
rationale for this position. The last official price provides a "measure
of stability in an environment of fluctuating exchange."' 37 His "pur-
pose/function" analysis flows from the legislative histories of the re-
spective conventions in which the delegates expressed concern over
stability.3 8 Yet, the official price approach is logically unsuitable be-
cause its basis, the official price of gold, has been abolished.
32. Barlow, supra note 18, at 15.
33. Heller, The Warsaw Convention and the "Two-Tier" Gold Market, 7 J. WORLD
TRADE L. 126, 129 (1973).
34. Mendelsohn, The Value of the Poincare Gold Franc in Limitation of Liability Conven-
tions, 5 J. MAR. L. & CoM. 125, 127 (1973).
35. See Barlow, supra note 18, at 16-17 nn.90-98.
36. Asser, Martin, Miller and Arcari are several of the advocates for the official price of
gold. For a more detailed analysis, see Barlow, supra note 18, at 17-19.
37. Asser, supra note 16, at 664.
38. Id. at 663-64.
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A third position favors the Special Drawing Rights (SDR)39 be-
cause it has presently taken gold's former role as a universal exchange
value. In advocating the SDR, one commentator has suggested that
the "[c]hoice of an appropriate unit of account ... remains incumbent
upon the courts in order to effectuate the intention of the signato-
ries. '4° A counter argument is that the SDR is a stranger to the
treaty that is based on a gold value. "The treaty is ... a law made by
the proper authority, and the courts of justice have no right to annul
or disregard any of its provisions .... It is their duty to interpret it
and administer it according to its terms.
41
B. Judicial Reactions
Judicial interpretations of the gold clause in conventions have
reached divergent conclusions. Some courts have supported the mar-
ket price of gold approach.42 Other courts have justified conversion
on the basis of the last official price of gold.4 3 Decisions to effectuate
39. The SDR is the IMF unit of account that is based on a basket of currencies.
40. Comment, The Demise of the Liability Limitations of the Warsaw Convention-An
Unnecessary Fatality: Franklin Mint Corp. v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 57 ST. JOHN'S L.
REV. 592, 608 (1983).
41. Doe v. Braden, 57 U.S. (16 How.) 635, 657 (1853).
42. For cases which follow this approach, see Brief for Trans World Airlines, Trans
World Airlines v. Franklin Mint Corp., 466 U.S. 243 (1984) (Stevens, J., dissenting) [hereinaf-
ter Brief] (citing Judgment of Aug. 11, 1978, Ct. of the Principal Civil Judge, Civil Station
Bangalore, India, Kuwait Airways Corp. v. Sanghi (an English translation of the case is set
forth at page 179 of the litigants' Joint Appendix (JA) submitted to the court in Trans World
Airlines v. Franklin Mint Corp., 466 U.S. 243 (1984)); Judgment of Aug. 27, 1976, Fed. Civil
& Commercial Ct., Buenos Aires, Argen., Florencia, Cia Argen. de Seguros S.A. v. Varig S.A.
(an English translation is set forth at JA169); Judgment of Jan. 10, 1974, Ct. App. of Athens,
Zakoupolos v. Olympic Airways Corp. (an English translation is set forth at JA165); Judg-
ment of June 9, 1981, Ct. App. of Milan, Italy, Cosida S.p.A. di Assicurazioni e Riassicura-
zioni v. B.E.A. (overruled by Law No. 84, Mar. 26, 1983, 90 GAZ. UFF. (April 1, 1983);
Judgment of Oct. 15, 1976, Ct. App. of Milan, Italy, Balkan Bulgarian Airlines v. Tammaro
(an English translation is sct forth at JA176); Judgment of Oct. 2, 1973, Lower Ct., G6teborg,
Swed., Saga v. Sagoland, discussed in 29 REV. FRANgAISE DR. AtRIEN 138 (1975); see also
Judgment of June 29, 1981, Ct. App. of Rome, Salavatti e Santori v. Alitalia, cited in Martin,
infra note 46, at 248 n.5; Miller v. American Airlines (1977) (an unreported Canadian deci-
sion), cited in Barlow, supra note 18, at 21 n.122.
43. For cases which follow this approach, see Trans World Airlines v, Franklin Mint
Corp., 466 U.S. 243 (1984) (Stevens, J., dissenting); Tele-Montagne v. Air Canada, 1976 Que-
bec C.S. 228, cited in Barlow, supra note 18, at 23 n. 134; Brief, supra note 42 (citing Judgment
of June 3, 1975, Fed. Ct. of App., Braz., Companhia de Seguros Maritimos v. Varig; Judgment
of Oct. 30, 1980, Ct. of Appeal of Aix-en-Provence, Fr., Pakistan International Airlines v.
Compagnie Air Inter S.A. (an English translation is set forth at JA133); Judgment of Feb. 10,
1973, Trib gr. inst., Paris, Association Aronautique v. Thirache, reprinted in 27 REV.
FRAN;AISE DR. AtRIEN 212 (1973); Judgment of Apr. 14, 1972, Supreme Ct., Neth.,
Hornlinie A.G. v. Societe National Petrole Aquitaine, 1972 NJ 728 (an English translation is
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conversion have even reflected judicial preference for the current
French franc44 and the SDR.
45
Numerous tribunals throughout the world have addressed this
issue, and some decisional patterns have emerged. Even though there
may be a need for uniformity in world decision-making as to matters
of universal concern, there still is no international stare decisis.
46
Additionally, foreign decisions need to be carefully scrutinized.
Martin rightly warns that a "judgement [sic] may reflect legal ideas
used in foreign legal systems and essential to the proper understand-
ing of the judgement [sic] but alien to those of the reader in another
jurisdiction. ' 47 Nations may do the same thing but for different rea-
sons. Obviously, similar decisions do not in themselves represent an
international body of case law, but these patterns may signal the
emergence of customary international law.
Based on a sample of twenty-two decisions, 48 courts have been
almost evenly split in choosing either a market price or official price
analysis. More recent decisions have relied on the SDR in construct-
ing a solution to the gold conversion problem.
49
World judicial opinions, in most respects, reflect courts' reliance
upon the previously explicated views of academicians. 50 An in-depth
case-by-case analysis of representative world decisions would be more
misleading than informative since such judgments are peculiarly re-
sponsive to local legal systems.
51
Yet, in broad terms, two fundamental rationales have emerged as
the bases for world judicial opinion. One line of authority empha-
set forth at JAIl 14); Judgment of Oct. 16, 1981, Ct. of App. of Valencia, Spain, Costell v.
Iberia, Lineas Afreas de Espafia, S.A. (an English translation is set forth at page 6 of the
Appendix to the Brief (BA6))).
44. See, e.g., Judgment of Mar. 7, 1983, Cass. civ. com., France, Chamie v. Egyptair,
cited in Brief, supra note 42 (an English translation is set forth at BA2).
45. See Brief, supra note 42, (citing Judgment of June 21, 1983, Commercial Ct. of App.
of Vienna, Aus., Kislinger v. Austrian Airtransport (an English translation is set forth at
BA12); Judgment of June 17, 1983, Ct. of App. of Linz, Aus., Rendezvous-Boutique-
Parfumerie Friedrich und Albine Breitinger GMBH v. Austrian Airlines (an English transla-
tion is set forth at BA22); Judgment of May 30, 1981, Supreme Ct., Neth., State of the Nether-
lands v. Giants Shipping Corp. (an English translation is set forth at JA72)).
46. Martin, The Price of Gold and the Warsaw Convention (I1), 6 AIR L. 246 (1981).
47. Id.
48. See supra notes 42-45.
49. Martin, supra note 46, at 248.
50. Id. at 246-47.
51. See generally Martin, supra note 46. This argument is convincingly presented by
Martin. But, for an expert analysis of some earlier caselaw that takes into account the varia-
tions in national laws, see K. ROSENN, supra note 3, at 269-73.
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sizes international harmony in the application of a uniform liability
limit by selecting the SDR as the conversion factor.52 The other line
of cases supports the concept of providing injured plaintiffs with fair
compensation. 53 Thus, courts frequently find themselves making a
policy choice between just compensation and the enforcement of a
liability limitation.
54
Regardless of the methodology employed to make the provisions
of a gold based convention work, is maintenance of value a judicial
responsibility? One must consider whether damage limitations are de-
sirable especially when the underlying purpose of uniformity can no
longer be served. Perhaps courts should construe these limits as nar-
rowly as possible to do as little damage as possible to general liability
concepts.55 On the other hand, "when the judge makes his choice in
how to fill the lacuna ... it is not the task of the judge to provide for
• . . [the decline in purchasing power], but it is up to the legislative
body of the treaty and/or the national legislator to intervene."'5 6 But
what if the legislative voice is silent? As a practical effect, any judicial
choice of a conversion factor will necessarily effect maintenance of
value.
C The Franklin Mint Case
Apparently, without clear legislative guidance, the United States
Supreme Court decided in Franklin Mint that the conversion factor
for gold based conventions should be the last official price of gold.
57
The Court adopted this standard because it "manifested the parties'
intention." 58 This important policy choice resulted from a shipper's
suit against an airline for cargo loss. The Court was faced with deter-
52. For judgments which follow this rationale, see Brief, supra note 42 (citing Judgment
of June 21, 1983, Commercial Ct. of App. of Vienna, Aus., Kislinger v. Austrian Airtransport
(an English translation is set forth at BA12); Judgment of May 30, 1981, Supreme Ct., Neth.,
State of the Netherlands v. Giants Shipping Corp. (an English translation is set forth at
JA7 1)).
53. An example is the market price analysis in Judgment of Oct. 15, 1976, Ct. App. of
Milan, Italy, Balkan Bulgarian Airlines v. Tammaro, cited in Brief, supra note 42 (an English
translation of the case is set forth at JA176).
54. See infra notes 60-70 and accompanying text which discusses how the U.S. has ap-
proached this issue.
55. K. ROSENN, supra note 3, at 272.
56. Judgment of May 30, 1981, Supreme Ct., Neth., State of the Netherlands v. Giants
Shipping Co., cited in Brief, supra note 42 (an English translation of the case is set forth at
JA72).
57. See Comment, supra note 40, at 596.
58. Id. at 596-97.
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mining the application of the liability limitation in the gold based
Warsaw Convention, which was originally conceived in 1929 to pro-
tect a fledgling airline industry and to provide plaintiffs with compen-
sation.59 When the issue came before the court in 1983, the industry's
vulnerability was no longer as great as it was in 1929. The Conven-
tion's interpretation became unsure and the purpose of its liability
limitation became even more questionable. Legitimate doubts arise
concerning the sensibility for plaintiffs to forego full recovery. The
task of resolving such an issue most appropriately belongs to the
legislature.
Unfortunately, no clear policy was ever defined because the U.S.
Senate has consistently failed to ratify any change to the original War-
saw Convention. For example, the legislative debate to the Montreal
Aviation Protocols6° demonstrates not only dissatisfaction with the
concept of an increase in liability, but also reaction against the failure
to provide a sufficient increase. 6' In the face of legislative inaction,
Franklin Mint provided the judiciary an opportunity to inquire into
the reasonableness of the liability limitations. The Court, however,
failed to maximize its opportunity to direct action on this issue.
At both the trial court and appellate court levels, 62 the shipper
recovered under the Warsaw Convention's Article Twenty-Two limi-
tation based upon the last official price of gold. The court of appeals,
however, declared that the repeal of the Par Value Modification
Act,63 which set an official price of gold in the United States, to be "an
explicit abandonment of the previously established unit of conver-
sion." 64 The court then held the Convention's liability limits to be
prospectively unenforceable because "[s]ubstitution of a new term [of
conversion] is a political question, unfit for judicial resolution.
'65
Judge Winter's ruling may not be optimal from a legislative
standpoint, in that it leaves a difficult issue unresolved, but it does
force the legislature to act. If more courts on a world wide basis
reached this conclusion, nations would act on their collective respon-
59. Id. at 592.
60. 129 CONG. REC. S2278 (daily ed. Mar. 8, 1983) (statements of Sen. Lautenberg and
Sen. Biden).
61. Id.
62. Franklin Mint Corp. v. Trans World Airlines, 525 F. Supp. 1288 (S.D.N.Y. 1981),
aff'd, 690 F.2d 303 (2d Cir. 1982).
63. Par Value Modification Act, Pub. L. No. 92-268, 86 Stat. 116 (1972), repealed by
Bretton Woods Agreements Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-564, § 6, 90 Stat. 2660, 2661 (1976).
64. Franklin Mint Corp. v. Trans World Airlines, 690 F.2d at 311.
65. Id.
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sibility of sensibly amending the Convention instead of individually
finding piecemeal solutions.
In contrast to the lower appellate court, the United States
Supreme Court held the repeal of the Par Value Modification Act to
be unrelated to the conversion requirements of the gold based Warsaw
Convention. 66 Instead, the repeal was to give formal effect to a new
international monetary system. 67 The majority was really concerned
with setting a stable, predictable and internationally uniform limit on
liability. Through interpretative magic, the Justices resurrected a
conversion factor previously abolished. In so doing, a policy choice
was made through an act of judicial legislation. Constructing a limit
on liability was viewed by the Court to be more important than con-
sidering the adequacy of this limit or the maintenance of its real value.
Justice Stevens, in his dissent, also ignored the maintenance of
value issue, noting that "[t]he rate at which a domestic currency ex-
changes for gold was and is the only 'conversion' permitted or antici-
pated by the Convention. That figure is the liability limitation of the
Warsaw Convention. '68 Stevens' market price analysis appears logi-
cally sounder because it is based on the Convention's own standard of
value and requires no rescission or reformation of the Convention it-
self. Coincidentally, gold, as a commodity, is somewhat more respon-
sive to the economic climate and may thus provide a more adequate
recovery than an inflexible sum, which can lose real value over time.
The Congressional Record of 1983 suggests that U.S. foreign pol-
icy was directed toward limiting the actual damages of each plaintiff
and the type of conduct of the carrier.69 By selecting the last official
price of gold as the conversion factor, the Supreme Court mistakenly
believed it was maintaining the status quo on the basis that "[t]he
political branches, which hold the authority to repudiate the Warsaw
Convention, have given no indication that they wish to do so. ''70 This
decision, however, undercuts the U.S. foreign policy goal to increase
the Convention's liability limits. Additionally, the legislative and ju-
dicial branches maintained inconsistent positions in the eyes of the
world which further weakened U.S. policy in this area. The Second
Circuit opinion, rendering the Convention prospectively unenforce-
66. Trans World Airlines v. Franklin Mint Corp., 466 U.S. 243, 252 (1984).
67. Id.
68. Id. at 275 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (emphasis added).
69. 129 CONG. REC. S2278 (daily ed. Mar. 8, 1983) (statements of Sen. Lautenberg and
Sen. Biden).
70. Trans World Airlines v. Franklin Mint Corp., 466 U.S. at 260-61 (1984).
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able, would have served U.S. interests better since that decision would
have forced the legislature to act.
The Franklin Mint decision is an example of how a national
court has grappled with the issue of liability limitations in gold based
conventions after the demonetization of gold. Courts have either not
recognized the distinct issues of limitation of liability/maintenance of
value, made a value judgment of one over the other, or felt compelled
to abstain from choosing believing this determination is within the
legislative province.
D. National Legislation
Lifting an unfair burden from their local courts, some nations
have squarely faced the problem of finding a conversion factor to gold
based conventions by enacting domestic legislation.7' These legisla-
tive bodies recognized that "[s]ubstitution of a new term [of conver-
sion] is a political question, unfit for judicial resolution. ' 72 The task
of substituting a conversion factor in an international agreement is
essentially a treaty making function that properly belongs to the exec-
utive and legislative branches. The making or revision of treaties is
within the domain of "diplomacy and legislation ... not ... the ad-
ministration of the laws. ' ' 73 In some cases, previous judicial decisions
were statutorily overturned.7 4 Few countries where treaties are not
superior to subsequent statute75 have remedied the conversion factor
dilemma by legislation. The Canadian, South African, and Italian
laws are typical, because a formula, based on the SDR, is fixed for
conversion purposes. 76 No statute focuses particularly on the mainte-
nance of value problem. The SDR is simply the preferred unit of
account.
71. See, e.g., Canada: Currency and Exchange Act (Carriage by Air Act Gold Franc
Conversion Regulations), 117 Can. Gaz. 431 (1983). For references to legislation passed by
Denmark, Finland, the Federal Republic of Germany, Israel, New Zealand, Norway, United
Kingdom and the Netherlands, see Barlow, supra note 18, at 3 n. 13.
72. Franklin Mint Corp. v. Trans World Airlines, 690 F.2d 303, 311 (2d Cir. 1982).
73. Whitney v. Robertson, 124 U.S. 190, 195 (1888).
74. Legislative choices for the SDR overturned decisions in Italy (market), Canada (offi-
cial) and Sweden (market). See supra notes 42-43.
75. For instance, in the United States, treaties always override state laws but treaties and
federal laws are of equal rank. When a conflict exists between a federal law and treaty, "the
last expression of the sovereign will control." Chae Chan Ping v. United States (The Chinese
Exclusion Case), 130 U.S. 581, 600 (1889).
76. See supra note 71.
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VI. PROPOSALS
A. Issue Recognition
As stated earlier, issue recognition by legislative bodies and both
domestic and international courts, and scholars is imperative. These
interrelated issues concern: (1) the selection of a unit of account; (2)
liability limitations in agreements; and (3) maintenance of value con-
siderations in the face of inflation. The purpose and function of each
of these issues must be closely examined before a workable solution
can be drawn.
77
B. Market Price Interpretation of Gold Clause
Politics may present a formidable barrier to the domestic or in-
ternational resolution of monetary issues. A government may implic-
itly acknowledge the importance of maintaining value while refusing,
for various political reasons, to directly address the issue through in-
dexation or other monetary correction legislation. Under such cir-
cumstances, to maintain value, a market price interpretation of the
gold clause would be the best hedge against inflation. Precious metals
such as gold are a "safe haven" in inflationary times or during polit-
ical unrest.78 While not precise, the free market price of gold may, at
least, fairly represent the economic climate. 79
Any fixed price, such as the last official price of gold, itself
quickly becomes an unreasonable limitation that subtly defeats the
purpose of liability limitations in international agreements. Under the
gold-based Warsaw Convention, for a forty-four pound suitcase, the
liability limit was $189 in 1929, $330 in 1934, $359 in 1972 and $400
in 1974. In terms of purchasing power, $330 in 1934 was equivalent
to $399 in 1929,80 $1,031 in 1972 and $1,215 in 1974.81 When the
convention was approved in 1929, five years before U.S. ratification in
77. Asser's purpose and function analysis in interpreting the minutes of hearings or de-
bates should be especially utilized by those engaged in this examination.
78. Rundle, Inflation's Diminishing Spectre is Augering Weakness in Gold, Other Precious
Metal Issues, Wall St. J., Aug. 24, 1984, at 41, col. 4.
79. For a graph comparing the gold price index to the U.S. Consumer Price Index, see
SUBCOMM. ON MONETARY AND FISCAL POLICY, 97th Cong., 1st Sess., The Gold Standard:
Its History and Record Against Inflation 18 (Jt. Comm. Print 1981) (The study was prepared
by R. Jastram, a professor in the School of Business Administration, University of California,
Berkeley.).
80. 1940 THE WORLD ALMANAC AND BOOK OF FACTS 606.
81. Reukema, No New Deal on Liability Limits for International Flights, 18 INT'L LAW.
983, 989 n.40 (1984) (citing 84 Daily Journal D.A.R. at 1489 n.34).
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1934, the American delegate envisioned a gold based liability limit of
$189, which was subsequently increased several times. However, the
injured plaintiff was still victimized by the decline in purchase power.
Mendelsohn, a free market supporter, concentrates on "the policy em-
bodied in the [liability] Conventions which was designed to protect
potential victims from the effects of inflation. ' 82 Relying on the price
of a commodity in a volatile market admittedly is not a suitably stable
measure. But, in unstable times, "[i]f world-wide inflation continues,
the real value of these international liability limitations may . . . [b]e
better protected if tied to the free market price of gold rather than to
the SDR.' ' s3 This consideration is even more important because com-
mercial aviation is no longer an infant industry that needs highly pro-
tective liability limits to insure its development and survival.
C. The IMF's SDR: An Imperfect Solution
The international community has placed much hope in the SDR
as gold's ultimate successor. In 1969, the IMF created the SDR to
replace gold and foreign currency8 4 in the international money reserve
markets. In practice, IMF banks exchange SDRs for other converti-
ble currencies as though they were lines of credit against which
reserves are borrowed for use in central banks.
85
Methods of calculating SDRs periodically change. Currently
they are calculated in reference to the U.S. dollar, the Deutschemark,
the French franc, the Japanese yen and the British pound sterling.
86
The amount of any one of the five currencies in one SDR is a function
of the percentage weights assigned to each currency. To illustrate, the
dollar value of one SDR is calculated by adding the dollar value of
each currency included in the "currency basket," based on the daily
market exchange rate. 7 This formulation does not insure absolute
stability in currency conversion. "The composite valuation of the
SDR does not guarantee that the SDR will be more stable than an
individual currency, 881 basically because of the unpredictability of ex-
82. Mendelsohn, supra note 34, at 127.
83. K. ROSENN, supra note 3, at 280.
84. The use of the SDR resulted in considerable relief for the besieged U.S. dollar.
85. Initially, SDRs were valued in terms of gold. This valuation changed with the Sec-
ond Amendment to the IMF Articles of Agreement, which broke the link between gold and
the SDR.
86. See Ward, supra note 3, at 3.
87. Id.
88. Id. (citing Eaker, Special Drawing Rights and the Pricing of Oil, I J. WORLD TRADE
L. 23 (1979)).
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change rate fluctuations.8 9 But this currency composite makes stabil-
ity more likely since the variations within the basket in some measure
counter each other. SDRs tend to be less prone to fluctuation than
the free market price of gold which at times falls prey to speculators.
Additionally reassuring is "the fact that the SDR ... [is] administered
by an international organization [which] is of special importance be-
cause it ensures a certain measure of continuity and uniformity of
interpretation . . . [and] would produce a flexibility of response
through an established decision making process." 90 Uniformity and
flexibility are indeed desirable characteristics of the SDR.
International acceptance has been manifested in recent conven-
tions91 that have incorporated the SDR as the appropriate value
clause to replace the tarnished gold clause. The advantage of an SDR
based liability convention is that it provides a measure of certainty
regarding the extent of potential liability unlike a gold free market
based convention where values could radically change on a daily ba-
sis. Additionally, as a unit of account, the SDR can be readily con-
verted into the applicable national currency. Regrettably, the SDR by
itself has no inherent ability to maintain real value.92 In an inflation-
ary economy, over time, as the SDR's component currencies'
purchase power decreases, the SDR's real value will similarly dimin-
ish. Still "[s]ubstitution of the SDR for gold as a maintenance-of-
value device in international conventions would appear to be a step in
the right direction. ' ' 93
D. SDR as the New World Unit of Account
Neither the SDR or gold, at its official price, can maintain real
value.94 Real value considerations should not cloud the fact that the
world monetary system requires a unit of account. The SDR has per-
formed that function remarkably well because (1) it is universally rec-
ognized, (2) relatively stable and (3) assures a conversion of equal
value upon transfer of currencies. 95 International agreement on a unit
89. See Ward, supra note 3, at 4.
90. Asser, supra note 16, at 668.
91. See, e.g., U.N. Convention of the Carriage of Goods by Sea of 1978 (The Hamburg
Rules), cited in Barlow, supra note 18, at 9 n.47; Montreal Protocol No.4, reprinted in A.
LOWENFELD, AVIATION LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS 991-1001 (2d ed. Documents Supp.
1981).
92. Ward, supra note 3, at 5.
93. K. ROSENN, supra note 3, at 280.
94. See supra text accompanying notes 81 & 92.
95. See generally supra notes 84-94 and accompanying text.
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of account in due time can develop into agreement on a maintenance
of value technique like indexation.
Critics see no value in constructing an index for international
purposes when indices have hardly succeeded on a national scale.
From descriptions of remedy to malady, "there is little agreement
among economists about the desirability of adopting comprehensive
indexation." 96 Adopting an index presumes that the difficult task of
constructing one has been completed. Problems to be resolved in-
clude (1) varying rates of inflation among countries, (2) varying con-
sumption patterns of goods and services which makes the selection of
price scales difficult and (3) determining the length of intervals for
periodic adjustment. 97
Indexation is an incomplete remedy since it raises more questions
than it can capably answer. And its potential success depends upon
two unknown factors: multinational cooperation and international
economic understanding.
E. Development of a Single Article Maintenance of Value Treaty:
An Unsure Approach
International interest, sufficiently generated, may encourage the
development of a single article maintenance of value treaty, if that
approach appears desirable. The goals of uniformity and stability of
value may sufficiently induce nations to explore the relatively untested
areas of law and economics. 98
In the early seventies as a solution to gold clause interpretation,
UNIDROIT proposed a one article treaty that would impose an offi-
cial rate to promote uniformity.99 This proposal has become moot
since the demonetization of gold, but the concept of establishing an
international standard for maintenance of value purposes is a good
one.
Even now gold clause interpretation is far from settled. "The
muddle can only be cleared up by effective international legisla-
96. K. ROSENN, supra note 3, at 375.
97. Ward, supra note 3, at 18-19.
98. See generally K. ROSENN, supra note 3, which is an authoritative work, standing
relatively alone, in a field that is yet to be developed. See especially the author's bibliography
which is a comprehensive selection of source materials.
99. Comment, Legal Problems in Compensation Under the Gold Clauses of Private Inter-
national Law Agreements, 63 GEO. L.J. 817 n.1 (1975) (citing Arcari, Gold Clauses in Interna-
tional Conventions, Int'l Inst. for the Unification of Private Law, study LVII, doc. 1/Rev. § 3
n.3 (1973)).
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tion."1 In one sweep, a convention may designate the SDR as the
new unit of account. In conjunction with this act, some kind of main-
tenance of value technique like indexation could also be implemented.
Instead of creating some complex indexation scheme, interna-
tional dialogue more realistically could result in an approximate value
approach. To construct a precise maintenance of value mechanism
that could completely account for the complexity of world economic
matters is a mind-boggling if not an impossible task, but an imprecise
attempt to maintain value is more desirable than not attempting it at
all. 10 1 One international agreement10 2 has a built in automatic in-
crease provision that is activated at certain intervals, after entry into
force, without the need of having an amendment conference. 0 3 A
periodic increase provision in an international agreement may not be
a panacea, but it is a stopgap measure to the erosion of real value
produced by inflation.
F. National Legislation
In the absence of international cooperation, national legislation
has addressed the dilemna of finding a suitable unit of account.1°4
More specifically, countries have dealt with the maintenance of value
issue with varying success. 105 Inevitably, hard policy choices are
made concerning the importance of limitations on value and how ef-
fectively these limitations are to be protected. Difficult choices may
be made concerning the protection of an infant industry over the rela-
tive worth of a human life.
I0 6
The goal of world uniformity may seem possible in a slowly mov-
ing country-by-country assault on maintenance of value considera-
tions. Perhaps the existence of too many national differences in
culture and economics defeats the justification for a world approach.
Successful ideas become assimilated and the continuing practice of
nations may serve as the basis for customary international law.107
100. Martin, supra note 46, at 249.
101. See Ward, supra note 3. See generally, K. ROSENN, supra note 3, chs. 1, 2, 4, & 8.
102. Guatemala City Protocol of 1971, reprinted in A. LOWENFELD, supra note 91, at 975-
84.
103. Ward, supra note 3, at 16.
104. See supra note 71 and accompanying text.
105. K. ROSENN, supra note 3, at 58-59.
106. Id. at 247-50.
107. Hogg, What is International Law?, in READINGS IN INTERNATIONAL LAW FROM
THE NAVAL WAR COLLEGE REVIEW 1947-1977, 61 U.S. NAVAL WAR C. REV. 35, 39-40 (R.
Lillich & J. Moore eds. 1980).
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G. Insurance
Reliance upon insurance can be a realistic solution to the risk of
losing real value over time. The remedial nature of insurance, in most
cases, does not lose its strength, unlike legislation which may eventu-
ally lose context, because risk calculations upon which it is based con-
tinuously change in response to new conditions. Successful past
experience with multivarious insurable interests has given insurers the
statistical expertise and sufficient broad base of financial resources to
develop, at least on a trial basis, a maintenance of value insurance
plan.
Theoretically, risk of loss should be borne by the party that is in
a better position to assume it. Government sponsorship 10 8 of a main-
tenance of value insurance program should be studied, and if feasible,
implemented. Objectives of governmental sponsorship would include
"use of insurance . . . to meet a problem of economic security,' °
provision for "insurance that cannot be offered privately," 0 and
"encouragement to private insurers through governmental rein-
surance. "1  1
A related point involves providing indexed insurance coverage to
consumers as a maintenance of value device. Not surprisingly, there
are many difficulties associated with indexing insurance;" 12 foremost
of which is "the actuarial unsoundness of creating indexed insurance
without correspondingly indexed supporting financial instru-
ments."' 13
VII. CONCLUSION
The touch of gold in international conventions has lost its reas-
suring gleam. Gold, for a time, served as both a unit of account and a
method of value maintenance with questionable success.' '4 Yet, who
could deny the psychological reassurance associated with gold, until it
108. R. KEETON, BASIC TEXT ON INSURANCE LAW 570-83 (1971).
109. Id. at 572. States, such as Florida, have been hospitable to the development of insur-
ance. "In response to the obvious success of Lloyd's and to the projected enormous increase
in capital needs for the international insurance market over the years, the Florida legislature
enacted enabling legislation which permits private parties to form and operate insurance ex-
changes." O'Naughton, The Insurance Exchange Of The Americas Inc., Dade Bar Bulletin,
Nov. 1985, at 1, col. 1. The potential of insurance is as unlimited as the imagination.
110. R. KEETON, supra note 108, at 576.
111. Id.
112. For a detailed analysis, see K. ROSENN, supra note 3, at 200-07.
113. Id. at 200.
114. See supra note 81 and accompanying text.
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became just another commodity subject to speculation. No one can
fully explain the doubling of the gold price from 1978 to 1980 or its
subsequent collapse."15 Despite such drastic market fluctuations, a
market price interpretation of the gold clause partially takes on the
issue of value maintenance in the absence of treaty renegotiation to
determine the appropriate limits to liability in gold based conventions.
The SDR has proven to be an effective unit of account. World
reliance on the SDR as an international unit of account may eventu-
ally lead to multinational cooperation in developing a maintenance of
value technique like indexation. Yet, gold's successor as a mainte-
nance of value device cannot be a substitute for "stabilizing monetary
policy. 11 6 In the wake of sound economic policy, "[w]e can have
money that is better than gold."
' 7
115. Peterson, A Gold Rush Sweeps America, N.Y. Times, July 29, 1984, § 3, at IF, col. 1.
116. Stein, supra note 15, at 2F, col. 4.
117. Id.

